Couple of good papers worth reading if you have the time:
(1) ‘What Privacy is For‘ Julie E. Cohen
Privacy has an image problem. Over and over again, regardless of the forum in which it is debated, it is cast as old-fashioned at best and downright harmful at worst — antiprogressive, overly costly, and inimical to the welfare of the body politic. Privacy advocates resist this framing but seem unable either to displace it or to articulate a comparably urgent description of privacy’s importance. No single meme or formulation of privacy’s purpose has emerged around which privacy advocacy might coalesce. Pleas to “balance” the harms of privacy invasion against the asserted gains lack visceral force.
Privacy shelters dynamic, emergent subjectivity from the efforts of commercial and government actors to render individuals and communities fixed, transparent, and predictable. It protects the situated practices of boundary management through which the capacity for self-determination develops.
(2) ‘The Dangers of Surveillance‘ Neil M. Richards
From the Fourth Amendment to George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, and from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to films like Minority Report and The Lives of Others, our law and culture are full of warnings about state scrutiny of our lives. These warnings are commonplace, but they are rarely very specific. Other than the vague threat of an Orwellian dystopia, as a society we don’t really know why surveillance is bad and why we should be wary of it. To the extent that the answer has something to do with “privacy,” we lack an understanding of what “privacy” means in this context and why it matters. We’ve been able to live with this state of affairs largely because the threat of constant surveillance has been relegated to the realms of science fiction and failed totalitarian states
(3) ‘Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law‘ Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
Privacy protections create winners and losers. So does the absence of privacy protections. The distributive implications of governmental decisions regarding privacy are often very significant, but they can be subtle too. Policy and academic debates over privacy rules tend not to emphasize the distributive dimensions of those rules, and many privacy advocates mistakenly believe that all consumers and voters win when privacy is enhanced. At the same time, privacy skeptics who do discuss privacy in distributive terms sometimes score cheap rhetorical points by suggesting that only those with shameful secrets to hide benefit from privacy protections. Neither approach is appealing, and privacy scholars ought to do better.